Full Report

The numbers behind Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation: as-reported financial statements and company metrics for FY2022–FY2026, traced to the source filings, opened with the share-price history those statements have to justify. Every linked figure opens the exact page of the filing it was printed on, with the statement row highlighted. Amounts in US$ millions unless noted.

Reading notes: Display scale is US$ millions for the whole tab. BAH's FY2022, FY2023 and FY2024 Form 10-Ks print the primary statements in thousands; FY2025 and FY2026 print in millions. Values are shown in millions; each citation anchor is the figure exactly as printed on the cited page (thousands for FY2022-FY2024, millions for FY2025-FY2026). Each of FY2022-FY2026 is cited to that fiscal year's own Form 10-K (income statement, balance sheet, cash-flow statement). Fiscal year ends March 31. Revenue breakdown uses BAH's reported 'Revenue by Customer Type' disaggregation (Note 3). FY2024 and the reclassified FY2025/FY2026 comparatives are read from the FY2026 10-K note; FY2023 and FY2025 from the FY2025 10-K note. FY2022 is from the standardized data feed on the reclassified basis (unlinked). Backlog KPIs are the MD A (Item 7) figures, which match the data feed. Total and Funded backlog are cited FY2024-FY2026; FY2022-FY2023 (older Item 1 basis) and Book-to-Bill (all years) are from the data feed and shown without page links.

Share Price — Full Available History — 16 Years

The stock closed at $65.87 on Jul 24, 2026 — up 242% over the window shown (+8.2% a year), trading between $11.90 and $186.00. At that close the stock trades at 9.5× FY2026 diluted EPS as reported below.

Source: market price feed, monthly closes, sampled from 3,944 source observations, Nov 2010–Jul 2026. Price return only, excludes dividends.

Market capitalization $9.9bn and enterprise value $13.1bn.

Market cap = 150.3M shares outstanding × the Jul 24, 2026 close of $65.87. Enterprise value adds total debt of $3.9bn and subtracts cash and equivalents of $728mn (net debt of $3.2bn), from the FY2026 balance sheet. Market-derived figures, shown without filing links.

FY2026 at a Glance

Source: FY2026 consolidated statements [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Revenue by Customer Type

Revenue by Customer Type	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026
Defense Customers	3,966	4,230	5,061	5,943	6,069
Intelligence Customers	1,573	1,684	1,763	1,867	1,900
Civil and Commercial Customers	2,825	3,345	3,838	4,170	3,248
Total Revenue	8,364	9,259	10,662	11,980	11,217
Total Revenue growth, derived	—	+10.7%	+15.2%	+12.4%	-6.4%

Source: Form 10-K Note 3, Revenue — Disaggregation of Revenue (reclassified basis beginning FY2025; FY2022 from standardized data feed) [5] [6]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Income Statement

Source: Consolidated Statements of Operations [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Columns marked E are consensus analyst estimates from S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ), shown alongside reported results for direct comparison; they are not company guidance.

Estimate source: S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ) consensus, as of 2026-07-24. Estimate figures are S&P Capital IQ consensus (vendor data — no filing page links). EPS and net income use the normalized (adjusted) consensus where the street reports it. Line-item analyst models (segments, drivers, KPIs) are in the Visible Alpha tab.

Balance Sheet

Source: Consolidated Balance Sheets [7] [8] [9] [10]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Cash Flow

Source: Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows [11] [12] [13] [14]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Long-Term Record

Fiscal year	Total revenue	Operating income	Net income	Diluted EPS	Operating cash flow
FY2017	5,809	506	261	1.72	382
FY2018	6,168	520	302	2.03	369
FY2019	6,704	602	419	2.91	500
FY2020	7,464	669	483	3.41	551
FY2021	7,859	754	609	4.37	719
FY2022	8,364	685	467	3.44	737
FY2023	9,259	447	272	2.03	603
FY2024	10,662	1,013	606	4.59	259
FY2025	11,980	1,370	935	7.25	1,009
FY2026	11,217	1,033	851	6.90	1,041

Source: consolidated statements across filings; older years from the standardized feed [11] [1] [12] [2]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Operating KPIs

KPI	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026
Total Backlog	29,247	31,202	32,113	37,027	38,187
Funded Backlog	3,710	4,619	4,187	4,421	4,319
Book-to-Bill Ratio	1.36	1.18	1.22	1.39	1.10

Source: company-reported operating metrics [15] [16]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Analyst Consensus

Street ratings: 3 strong buy, 8 hold, 2 sell, 1 strong sell. Consensus: Hold.

Estimate source: S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ) consensus, as of 2026-07-24. Estimate figures are S&P Capital IQ consensus (vendor data — no filing page links). EPS and net income use the normalized (adjusted) consensus where the street reports it. Line-item analyst models (segments, drivers, KPIs) are in the Visible Alpha tab.

Traceability

252 of 305 figures on this page (83%) link to the filing page where they are printed — click a linked figure to open the source PDF at that page with the row highlighted. Unlinked figures come from standardized data feeds or pre-filing years.

• Display scale is US$ millions for the whole tab. BAH's FY2022, FY2023 and FY2024 Form 10-Ks print the primary statements in thousands; FY2025 and FY2026 print in millions. Values are shown in millions; each citation anchor is the figure exactly as printed on the cited page (thousands for FY2022-FY2024, millions for FY2025-FY2026).

• Each of FY2022-FY2026 is cited to that fiscal year's own Form 10-K (income statement, balance sheet, cash-flow statement). Fiscal year ends March 31.

• Revenue breakdown uses BAH's reported 'Revenue by Customer Type' disaggregation (Note 3). FY2024 and the reclassified FY2025/FY2026 comparatives are read from the FY2026 10-K note; FY2023 and FY2025 from the FY2025 10-K note. FY2022 is from the standardized data feed on the reclassified basis (unlinked).

• Backlog KPIs are the MD A (Item 7) figures, which match the data feed. Total and Funded backlog are cited FY2024-FY2026; FY2022-FY2023 (older Item 1 basis) and Book-to-Bill (all years) are from the data feed and shown without page links.

• FY2017-FY2021 long-term-record figures are from the standardized data feed / filings outside the corpus and are shown without page links.

• Quarterly block covers the six most recent 10-Q quarters (Q1 FY2025-Q3 FY2026). Income statement uses the single-quarter (three-months-ended) column; balance sheet is point-in-time; cash-flow single quarters are derived from the printed year-to-date statements and reconcile exactly to the data feed's quarterly cash flow. Q2 FY2025 operating income and net income are elevated by a large gain recognized that quarter.

• 4 figure(s) differed between the data feed and the filing; the filing value is shown (see the run's metrics/metrics_tab.json for the audit trail).

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Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation's management explains the business in its own materials. The slides below do the most of that work, pulled from the documents preserved in Sources. Each source link opens the complete presentation at that slide in a new tab.

Q4 FY2026 Earnings Presentation — FY2026

The most recent full-year deck: FY2026 results, capital deployment, and the initial FY2027 guidance management now works to. · Open the full document →

Q4 FY2025 Earnings Presentation — FY2025

The FY2025 deck, notable for grading management's completed FY2023–2025 investment thesis against the targets it set. · Open the full document →

Q4 FY2024 Earnings Presentation — FY2024

The FY2024 deck, in the older format that still carried the business-model charts — demand pipeline and capital history later decks dropped. · Open the full document →

More from management

Q3 FY2026 Earnings Presentation — Q3 FY2026 · 17 pages · The interim quarter before the FY2026 annual deck, with a guidance-range crosswalk for the year. · Open →

Q2 FY2026 Earnings Presentation — Q2 FY2026 · 16 pages · Mid-year FY2026 update; same financial-summary format as the featured annual decks. · Open →

Q2 FY2025 Earnings Presentation — Q2 FY2025 · 17 pages · The quarter that revised FY2025 guidance and walked through three discrete items behind the change. · Open →

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Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation's management answers for the business every quarter. These are the exchanges that explain it best — verbatim, from the call transcripts preserved in Sources. Each link opens the full transcript at that page in a new tab.

Q4 FY2026 Earnings Call — Q4 FY2026

The clearest current-state picture: a bifurcated business with Civil still declining and National Security carrying growth, and the plainest account of how outcome-based work is meant to break revenue free of headcount. · Open the full transcript →

The transformation thesis in one answer: why productivity, fixed price and IP monetization should let revenue grow faster than headcount.

Horacio Rozanski (Chairman & CEO); question from Gavin Parsons (UBS): Over time, not only in FY '27, but over time, we expect to see productivity gains from some of the work that we've done, for example, around delayering, identifying our business, both on the infrastructure, but importantly, in the way we prosecute the market, the move to outcome-based and fixed price and the monetization of our IP. And so that is what's going to diverge the curves between headcount growth and revenue growth. And as I've said, I would expect that over time, you will see higher profit growth and revenue growth and higher revenue growth and headcount growth. […] on the OTA front, we've seen a 50% increase in wins year-over-year, but a 90% increase in the pipeline, which means that that trend is accelerating

p. 5 · Read in context →

Contract economics: on cost-plus work Booz Allen keeps only about 40% of the savings it takes out — the rest goes back to the customer.

Troy Lahr (EVP & CFO); question from Scott Mikus (Melius Research): We generally get to keep about 40% of the cost reductions given the nature of our contracts. Of the cost that we took out, we generally realized about one-third of it in fiscal year 2026.

p. 11 · Read in context →

Capital allocation priorities under an executive order on contractor payouts — dividend first, buybacks continue.

Troy Lahr (EVP & CFO); question from Scott Mikus (Melius Research): We maintain a capital deployment strategy that supports growth and drives shareholder returns. Our first priority is paying the dividend. We also have a very disciplined and strategic view of inorganic investments, especially around cyber and defense tech. […] But you will still see us do share repurchases. We will keep doing buybacks; you see that in the share guide. We have a very healthy balance sheet and a lot of financial flexibility.

p. 11 · Read in context →

Q4 FY2025 Earnings Call — Q4 FY2025

The reckoning: as government-efficiency cuts hit, management restructures the Civil business, cuts roughly 7% of staff, and resets the revenue algorithm investors had relied on. · Open the full transcript →

The reset quantified: two ~3% Civil revenue headwinds and an ~7% first-quarter staff reduction.

Matt Calderone (EVP & CFO): Since the beginning of April, we have seen a reduction in the run rate on five of our large civil technology projects that we believe will collectively create about a 3% headwind to firm-wide revenue for fiscal year 2026. […] The impact of the loss of previously disclosed recompete at the VA now represents an additional approximately 3% headwind to our consolidated top line for FY 2026. […] we anticipate approximately a 7% reduction in Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation's staff in the first quarter. This is heavily concentrated in our civil business.

p. 4 · Read in context →

Asked how he knows the Civil damage is contained and not just the first shoe to drop, the CEO frames the two overlapping dynamics behind the reset.

Horacio Rozanski (Chairman & CEO); question from Gavin Parsons (UBS): Hey, Gavin. Thanks for the question. Let me try and frame the entirety of what we see and try and answer your question from that perspective. […] our civil business is going through what we hope will be a one-time reset where most of the reviews have been concluded very positively regarding our technology and our work. However, we're facing this deceleration at a time where procurements are still somewhat frozen. On the other side of the dynamic is continued strength in our defense business and growing strength in our intelligence business. […] Our approach has been to take significant restructuring in our civil business now so that we are positioned to grow and can invest across the portfolio.

p. 6 · Read in context →

The revenue algorithm decoded — 'headcount growth plus 3%' — and why Civil's more fixed-price mix breaks the old formula.

Matt Calderone (EVP & CFO); question from Sheila Kahyaoglu (Jefferies): Our business is changing, and there are three dynamics where the traditional algorithm may look a little different than what we've experienced in the past. First, we referenced in the prepared remarks, we're actually winning a lot of work. Our bookto-bill last quarter was 0.7 times, very much in line with historical averages, winning over two billion dollars in work particularly in our defense and intel spaces. We anticipate our book-to-bill this quarter will be in line, if not better than historic norms. The second factor is the move to outcome-based contracting, which we've advocated for years. Over time, you would expect that to be accretive to margins. Finally, the third factor is what you referenced, which is the traditional headcount math. We mentioned that most of our busines is not fixed price. Typically, the algorithm is headcount growth plus 3%. Since the reductions we are seeing are primarily in civil, which is more fixed price, the traditional formulas might not apply here as strictly.

p. 8 · Read in context →

Confronted directly on Booz Allen's bruised public image, the CEO on why it draws the scrutiny and how he answers it.

Horacio Rozanski (Chairman & CEO); question from Ronald Epstein (Bank of America): You know, I think a couple of things about this. First, when you are the market leader, you're the most interesting to write about, and we have the distinct pleasure of being written about frequently. We tend to be humble and relatively quiet about our communications; we've always wanted our customers to take credit for their wins because it's ultimately their decisions supported by our technology. […] Once people interact with the technology we've built, that speaks louder than any article. I believe our brand will be strengthened as a result of all this scrutiny.

p. 10 · Read in context →

Q3 FY2025 Earnings Call — Q3 FY2025

The first call under the new administration and DOGE — where management argues the VoLT strategy was built for exactly this stress test, months before the Civil cuts actually landed. · Open the full transcript →

Inside the talent engine: AI now reads 1,000+ resumes a night, letting the firm ramp staffing up and down far faster than before.

Horacio Rozanski (Chairman, CEO & President); question from Gautam Khanna (TD Cowen): We have gotten a lot faster in the way we can recruit and deploy. And so we can really compress the acceleration, deceleration process of our recruiting by a lot. For example, we are using artificial intelligence in different ways. So, now we get, call it, 1,000-plus resumes a day. They are read the same night in which the resumes come in and deployed against the potential opportunities out there. We didn’t have that capability two years ago.

p. 7 · Read in context →

Q4 FY2022 Earnings Call — Q4 FY2022

The blueprint every later call refers back to — the launch of the VoLT strategy and the three-year investment-thesis targets, in management's own words. · Open the full transcript →

The strategy defined: VoLT — velocity, leadership, technology — and the ambition to bring innovation faster than the pace of change.

Horacio Rozanski (President & CEO): At investor day, we introduced VoLT, our growth strategy. VoLT reflects our ambitions and guides us as we build the Booz Allen of the future. In our next era, we will scale Booz Allen to an even greater level of industry leadership.

We will be the premier partner to the federal government, continuously bringing innovation to national priority missions, faster than the pace of change. VoLT stands for velocity, leadership and technology. These three words are the fundamental principles for how we are transforming to achieve our aspirations.

p. 5 · Read in context →

The financial thesis in numbers: +50% adjusted EBITDA through FY2025, 5-8% organic growth, mid-10s margins, and billions in capital deployment.

Lloyd Howell (EVP, CFO & Treasurer): Before walking you through our results, I do want to frame the conversation in the context of our investment thesis, which is centered around growing adjusted EBITDA dollars by 50% through fiscal year 2025.

To achieve this objective, we define long-term financial targets at our investor day that will guide us. First, 5% to 8% annual organic revenue growth. Second, adjusted EBITDA margins stabilizing in the mid-10s. And lastly, deploying between $3.5 billion and $4.5 billion in capital.

p. 9 · Read in context →

A concrete proof point of the strategy: the $1.5bn eMAPS recompete, the largest single task order in company history.

Lloyd Howell (EVP, CFO & Treasurer): we had several notable wins in the fourth quarter, including our $1.5 billion eMAPS to recompete, the largest single task order in our company's history.

p. 10 · Read in context →

More calls

Q3 FY2026 Earnings Call — Q3 FY2026 · 12 pages · Go here for how the recovery is tracking mid-FY26: execution of the October cost-reduction program and how Booz Allen managed through the longest government shutdown in history. · Open →

Q2 FY2026 Earnings Call — Q2 FY2026 · 12 pages · The second downgrade — management pushes the Civil return-to-growth out by several quarters and launches a fresh cost-reduction program, with ~90% of bookings now in National Security. · Open →

Q1 FY2026 Earnings Call — Q1 FY2026 · 11 pages · The first quarter after the ~7% cut: how the Civil restructuring landed in the numbers and how procurement executive orders are reshaping demand. · Open →

Q2 FY2025 Earnings Call — Q2 FY2025 · 12 pages · The last pre-election call — the VoLT thesis at cruising altitude, useful as the baseline against which the post-transition disruption is measured. · Open →

Q4 FY2024 Earnings Call — Q4 FY2024 · 13 pages · The pre-shock annual: double-digit-growth-era results and the full-year guidance framework before government-efficiency cuts changed the story. · Open →

Q1 FY2025 Earnings Call — Q1 FY2025 · 10 pages · Peak growth-era momentum and management's early read on how a coming administration change might play out for federal IT spending. · Open →

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Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation's annual reports contain management's most considered account of the business. These are the sections, passages and visual pages worth opening in the originals preserved in Sources.

Booz Allen Hamilton — FY2026 Annual Report (Form 10-K) — FY2026 (year ended March 31, 2026)

Latest 10-K, and the one where the DOGE-era spending squeeze first hits: revenue fell 6% to $11.2B on a slowed-procurement, shutdown-hit federal market. · Open the full document →

Item 1. Business — Overview & Our Technology — p. 5 · Read the full section →

How Booz Allen frames itself today: an 'advanced technology company' for government, and the federal government's largest AI provider.

From 112-year consultancy to advanced-technology company for government.

Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation (herein referred to as “Booz Allen,” the “Company,” “we,” “us,” or “our”) is an advanced technology company building products and solutions for government and business. For more than 112 years, Booz Allen has evolved to meet the needs of commercial, international, and government customers. […] In 2013, Booz Allen began another massive multi-year transformation by making significant investments in the emerging technologies that would help transform government. The Company rebuilt its workforce with technologists that bring deep mission expertise in national security and other core government missions. These investments propelled Booz Allen as a leader in artificial intelligence (“AI”), cyber, quantum, and other advanced technologies.

p. 5 · Read in context →

Positions itself as the federal government's largest AI provider, ~400 active AI projects.

As the federal government’s largest AI provider with approximately 400 active AI projects, we build secure AI solutions and advanced capabilities spanning agentic AI, physical AI, and AI-Radio Access Network (AI-RAN), and other emerging technologies designed for mission critical environments.

p. 7 · Read in context →

Item 1. Business — Our Customers — p. 9 · Read the full section →

The customer base is almost entirely the U.S. government across Defense, Intelligence and Civil; the VA alone is 10% of revenue.

Diverse public/private base, but Veterans Affairs is the single largest customer at 10% of revenue.

Booz Allen is committed to solving our customers’ toughest challenges, and we work with a diverse base of public and private sector customers across a number of industries in the U.S. and select foreign locations. […] Our civil government customers include many of the civil agencies of the U.S. government, of which the Department of Veterans Affairs was the single largest customer in fiscal 2026, from which we derived 10% of our revenue.

p. 9 · Read in context →

Item 1. Business — Contracts & Competition — p. 9 · Read the full section →

The revenue engine and its rivals: 84% of revenue rides on IDIQ task orders, competed against software, defense and services giants.

5,026 contracts; ~84% of revenue from IDIQ task orders, top vehicle ~17%.

We delivered solutions, outcomes, and services under 5,026 contracts and task orders in fiscal 2026 and approximately 84% of our revenue was derived from 2,426 active task orders under IDIQ contract vehicles. Our top IDIQ contract vehicle represented approximately 17% of our revenue in fiscal 2026.

p. 11 · Read in context →

Competes with enterprise software, global tech, defense primes, integrators and startups.

We operate in highly competitive markets, and we compete with companies of all types and sizes. Our major competitors include large enterprise software companies, large global technology providers, government contractors focused principally on the provision of technology services to the U.S. government, large defense contractors that provide both products and technology services to the U.S. government, diversified service providers, systems integrators, small businesses, and technology startups.

p. 11 · Read in context →

Item 1. Business — Our People and Culture — p. 11 · Read the full section →

The talent-and-clearance moat: ~31,500 people, ~77% holding security clearances — the barrier a competitor cannot buy.

~31,500 employees; ~77% hold security clearances, ~30% veterans.

As of March 31, 2026, we employed approximately 31,500 people across the U.S. and select global regions, including 28,800 customer staff. We work in 23 countries, with 32 major business centers and more than 20 engineering, manufacturing, and R&D facilities. […] Nearly 30% of our workforce identifies as veterans or individuals with military experience, and approximately 77% of our employees hold security clearances (based on voluntary selfreporting).

p. 11 · Read in context →

Item 1A. Risk Factors — p. 16 · Read the full section →

The two risks that actually bind Booz Allen: dependence on U.S. government spending, and the supply of clearance-eligible talent.

Demand risk: government spending levels and efficiency drives can cut revenue.

U.S. government spending levels and mission priorities could change in a manner that adversely affects our future revenue and limits our growth prospects. […] Our business depends upon continued U.S. government expenditures on defense, intelligence, and civil programs for which we provide support. These expenditures have not remained constant over time, have been and in the future may be reduced in certain periods, and have been and in the future may be affected by the U.S. government’s efforts to improve efficiency and reduce costs affecting U.S. government programs generally.

p. 19 · Read in context →

Supply risk: intense competition for scarce, clearance-eligible personnel.

Our business depends in large part upon our ability to attract and retain sufficient numbers of highly qualified individuals who may have advanced degrees and/or appropriate security clearances. We compete for such qualified personnel with other U.S. government contractors, the U.S. government, and private industry, and such competition is intense. Personnel with the requisite skills, qualifications, or security clearance may be in short supply or generally unavailable.

p. 30 · Read in context →

Item 7. MD&A — U.S. Political, Budget and Regulatory Environment — p. 67 · Read the full section →

Management's own account of the FY2026 headwind: efficiency reviews, contract cancellations and a slowed procurement pipeline.

Item 7. MD&A — Contract Backlog — p. 69 · Read the full section →

Backlog is the forward book; it grew to $38B, but management warns the slowed environment is impairing conversion to revenue.

Item 7. MD&A — Results of Operations: Revenue — p. 76 · Read the full section →

The plainest statement of what drove the year: a 6% revenue decline tied to a shutdown and funding slowdown.

Revenue down 6% to $11.2B on slowed procurement and the Q3 government shutdown.

Revenue decreased 6% to $11,217 million, primarily driven by the impact of a slowed procurement and funding environment, including the government shutdown that occurred in the third quarter of fiscal 2026. These factors drove a decrease in headcount, as well as a decline in billable expenses.

p. 76 · Read in context →

Booz Allen Hamilton — FY2022 Annual Report (Form 10-K) — FY2022 (year ended March 31, 2022)

Included for one contrast: four years ago Booz Allen described itself as a management-consulting firm with technical capabilities — the opposite emphasis of the FY2026 'advanced technology company.' · Open the full document →

Item 1. Business — Overview — p. 7 · Read the full section →

The pre-repositioning self-description: 'deep expertise in management consulting' comes first, technology second.

FY2022 framing: blends management-consulting expertise with advanced technical capabilities.

Building on our legacy of passionate client service and guided by our long-term growth strategy, we blend deep expertise in management consulting with advanced technical capabilities to deliver powerful solutions.

p. 7 · Read in context →

More annual reports

Booz Allen Hamilton — FY2025 Annual Report (Form 10-K) — FY2025 · 119 pages · The peak year before the squeeze: revenue $11.98B; useful baseline against the FY2026 decline. · Open →

Booz Allen Hamilton — FY2024 Annual Report (Form 10-K) — FY2024 · 142 pages · Revenue $10.66B; first year presenting the VoLT strategy narrative. · Open →

Booz Allen Hamilton — FY2023 Annual Report (Form 10-K) — FY2023 · 145 pages · Transition-year 10-K bridging the consulting-era framing to the technology repositioning. · Open →

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Competitors describe Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation's market in their own filings and calls. These verified passages and visual pages show where their strategies meet, using source documents preserved in Sources.

Leidos Holdings, Inc. (LDOS)

The largest US federal IT and technical-services contractor; competes with Booz Allen across national-security digital, cyber and AI-enabled mission work, and names Booz Allen as a principal competitor.

Leidos's 10-K lists Booz Allen among its principal competitors and flags AI and Federal Acquisition Regulation reform as widening the field.

Our principal competitors currently include the following companies: Accenture Federal Services LLC, Amentum Services Inc., KBR, Inc., BAE Systems, Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., CACI International Inc., Deloitte, General Dynamics Corporation, GovCIO, IBM, KBR Inc., L3Harris Technologies, Inc., Lockheed Martin Corporation, ManTech, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Optum, Parsons Corporation, Peraton Inc., RTX Corporation and SAIC. […] Technological advances, including artificial intelligence, autonomy and robotics, changing customer requirements, as well as the ongoing significant reform of the Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") are enabling expanded competition from both traditional and nontraditional competitors.

p. 15 · Read in context →

CEO sizes the intelligence-community budget trajectory and frames AI as a tailwind, not a threat, in the digital/mission market Booz Allen also serves.

Tom Bell — Chief Executive Officer: the intelligence community budgets have grown 4% to 5% annually since 2022, and we see that continuing. In the classified budgets, you see a lot of money going into the digital infrastructure part of the ecosystem for defense and intelligence. That's why AI isn't a disruptor for us, it's a propellant to our progress in this business.

p. 10 · Read in context →

CEO details how DOGE-driven government cost-cutting shows up operationally — stop-work orders, terminations and pricing reviews — across the federal-services market.

Thomas A. Bell — Chief Executive Officer: we have been closely monitoring all disruptions related to DOGE and DOGE-related contracts over the past six months. This includes stop work orders, terminations, descopes, and what we refer to as DOGE-inspired pricing reviews.

p. 12 · Read in context →

CACI International Inc (CACI)

A core defense and intelligence technology provider overlapping Booz Allen in cyber, mission IT and analytics for national-security customers.

CACI's 10-K characterises its market as fragmented with no dominant player, and states an intent to gain share both organically and through acquisitions — the same addressable pool Booz Allen pursues.

We know of no single competitor that is dominant in our fields of technology. We have a relatively small share of the addressable market for our Expertise and Technology and intend to achieve growth and increase market share both organically and through strategic acquisitions.

p. 7 · Read in context →

CEO says GSA/DOGE efficiency actions hit the federal-civilian market hard but not CACI, which deliberately pivoted its portfolio toward defense and intelligence in 2019 — a pointed contrast with peers still exposed to civilian budgets.

John S. Mengucci — President and Chief Executive Officer: I think you've seen a lot of the cost efficiency, those GSA actions really hitting the federal civilian area hard. But as the CEO of a publicly traded company who moved away from that market a number of years back, it really doesn't have any impact.

p. 9 · Read in context →

CEO on competitor behaviour under budget pressure, implying rivals are turning more price-aggressive, with a rise in contract protests.

John Mengucci — President and Chief Executive Officer: if we've ever lost on price, it's not because we're in a price shootout because we gave up that part of the ecosystem about 7 to 8 years back. But I would imagine people are going to do whatever they need to do to continue to win business. I mean, we've seen a little uptick in the number of protests, which are out there.

p. 10 · Read in context →

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)

A pure-play technology-services provider to the US government; among Booz Allen's closest business-model peers in systems integration, digital engineering and mission IT.

CFO argues undifferentiated, labour-based government services are the most exposed to recompetes and efficiency pressure — a lens on where staff-heavy federal work is vulnerable.

Prabu Natarajan — Chief Financial Officer: there are parts of the market where you're focused on pure labor-based services, without differentiation, in sort of either enterprise IT or mission IT that is hard to differentiate you are vulnerable for recompetes. […] I think it would be a crisis that's wasted by industry if we don't step up and change the way we go to market.

p. 6 · Read in context →

CFO on commercial and non-traditional entrants pushing into government work, and why 'mission integration' is the moat incumbents such as SAIC and Booz Allen rely on.

Prabu Natarajan — Chief Financial Officer: Clearly, there we are seeing new entrants in the market, nontraditional, with more commercial orientation to them. […] I think we believe sincerely that the offerings from commercial vendors still will require mission integration at its core to be able to operate inside of the government environment. So we welcome the competition in the industrial base.

p. 4 · Read in context →

SAIC's 10-K describes a government-services market where competition has intensified, sole-source awards are fewer and price and affordability increasingly decide awards.

Competition within the government services industry has intensified, which has led to fewer sole-source awards and an increased emphasis on cost competitiveness and affordability.

p. 14 · Read in context →

Parsons Corporation (PSN)

Its Federal Solutions segment competes with Booz Allen across cyber, intelligence, missile defence and space; Parsons names Booz Allen first in its federal peer group.

Parsons' 10-K names Booz Allen first in its Federal Solutions peer group of US federal systems integrators.

Our peer group in Federal Solutions are U.S. federal systems integrators and service providers such as Booz Allen Hamilton, CACI International Inc, Leidos Holdings, Inc., and Science Applications International Corporation.

p. 24 · Read in context →

Parsons reports its contract win rates, including a 99.6% re-compete win rate in fiscal 2025 — a benchmark for incumbent retention on federal work.

We achieved an overall win rate of 61% in fiscal 2025 […] which includes strong re-compete win rates of 99.6% in fiscal 2025 giving us long-term certainty on key contracts.

p. 8 · Read in context →

Parsons' Federal Solutions capability list overlaps Booz Allen's national-security portfolio across cyber, intelligence, missile defence, electronic warfare and space.

We provide critical technologies, including cyber; integrated air and missile defense; intelligence; aviation modernization; electronic warfare; space ground systems, cislunar, A-PNT, and classified sensors; geospatial intelligence; signals intelligence; environmental remediation; border security and counter-drug, critical infrastructure protection; counter unmanned air systems; biometrics; and bio surveillance.

p. 6 · Read in context →

ICF International, Inc. (ICFI)

A federal and commercial consulting firm competing with Booz Allen on civilian-agency advisory, digital and AI work; ICF names Booz Allen as a principal competitor.

ICF's 10-K lists Booz Allen Hamilton among its principal competitors in the federal-consulting market.

Some of our principal competitors include: Abt Global; Accenture; AECOM Technology Corporation; Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation; CACI International Inc.; CLEAResult; Deloitte LLP; General Dynamics, Inc.; Guidehouse; Leidos Holdings, Inc.; PA Consulting Group; Science Applications International Corporation; Research Triangle Institute, International; Tetra Tech Inc.; and Westat, Inc.

p. 18 · Read in context →

CEO quantifies the federal-demand contraction ICF absorbed as the administration cut spending — a read on the civilian-agency exposure Booz Allen also carries.

John Wasson — Chief Executive Officer: our revenues from federal government clients, which declined 9.8% sequentially, representing a 25.2% reduction from last year's second quarter.

p. 2 · Read in context →

Maximus, Inc. (MMS)

A government health and citizen-services provider overlapping Booz Allen on federal digital modernization and AI-enabled services; Maximus names Booz Allen as a federal competitor.

Maximus's 10-K names Booz Allen among its primary US Federal Services competitors.

Our primary competitors in the U.S. Federal Services Segment are General Dynamics Information Technology, Deloitte, Leidos, IBM, Accenture, Booz Allen Hamilton, and other federal contractors.

p. 11 · Read in context →

CEO positions Maximus's AI 'Total Experience Management' platform for a multibillion-dollar government market — the AI-for-government demand Booz Allen also targets.

Bruce L. Caswell — President and Chief Executive Officer: one representative of a federal agency acknowledged TXM as the most sophisticated deployment of AI in a contact center environment that they had seen to date. We continue to invest in TXM as we address this multibillion-dollar government market.

p. 4 · Read in context →

More peer documents

CACI Q3 FY2026 earnings call — Q3 FY2026 · 13 pages · CEO refreshes the total addressable market (~$300bn vs CACI's ~$10bn) and flags electronic warfare and counter-UAS as growth areas. · Open →

Leidos Q3 FY2025 earnings call — Q3 FY2025 · 11 pages · Golden Dome SHIELD IDIQ and a large near-term pipeline, plus resilience through DOGE disruption and the government shutdown. · Open →

Parsons Q4 FY2025 earnings call — Q4 FY2025 · 15 pages · CEO sizes an ~$85bn reconciliation-driven addressable market and describes the IT-services 'dichotomy', naming CACI and Leidos. · Open →

Parsons Q1 FY2026 earnings call — Q1 FY2026 · 14 pages · Defense-budget sizing ($1.5tn FY2027 request) and Parsons' playbook for operating under a full-year continuing resolution. · Open →

SAIC Q4 FY2026 earnings call — Q4 FY2026 · 12 pages · CFO names the enterprise-IT recompetes SAIC lost (NASA Aegis, Cloud One, CENTCOM) where cost-plus work is hard to differentiate. · Open →

Maximus Q4 FY2025 earnings call — Q4 FY2025 · 11 pages · CEO sizes the defense services/software TAM and Maximus's targeted push into national-security and cyber — Booz Allen's core turf. · Open →

Maximus Q3 FY2025 earnings call — Q3 FY2025 · 12 pages · Scale claim (~60% of national Medicaid enrollment) and how DOGE staff are shifting toward modernization and contract consolidation. · Open →

ICF Q3 FY2025 earnings call — Q3 FY2025 · 11 pages · CEO attributes Department of Energy contract cancellations to DOGE and GSA actions — granular colour on civilian-agency funding cuts. · Open →

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Source: S&P Capital IQ consensus via Xpressfeed · Generated 2026-07-24.

Five straight revenue misses, but EPS beat 30%+ in the last two prints

Revenue has come in below consensus every quarter since FY2025 Q4, the misses widening to the mid-single-digit range. Normalized EPS, by contrast, surprised +37% and +31% in the two most recent quarters — the earnings line is holding up far better than the revenue line.

Current sequences by metric: Revenue: 5 consecutive misses; EPS (normalized): 2 consecutive beats.

Currency: USD · Scale: money in millions, absolute · Consensus is captured before each actual first became effective.

Quarter	Metric	Consensus	Actual	Surprise	Outcome
Q4 FY2026	Revenue	$2.87bn	$2.78bn	-2.9%	Miss
Q4 FY2026	EPS (normalized)	$1.36	$1.78	+30.7%	Beat
Q3 FY2026	Revenue	$2.75bn	$2.62bn	-4.7%	Miss
Q3 FY2026	EPS (normalized)	$1.29	$1.77	+37.1%	Beat
Q2 FY2026	Revenue	$2.99bn	$2.89bn	-3.3%	Miss
Q2 FY2026	EPS (normalized)	$1.51	$1.49	-1.5%	Miss
Q1 FY2026	Revenue	$2.95bn	$2.92bn	-0.8%	Miss
Q1 FY2026	EPS (normalized)	$1.45	$1.48	+2.2%	Beat
Q4 FY2025	Revenue	$3.03bn	$2.97bn	-1.9%	Miss
Q4 FY2025	EPS (normalized)	$1.61	$1.61	-0.3%	Miss
Q3 FY2025	Revenue	$2.87bn	$2.92bn	+1.8%	Beat
Q3 FY2025	EPS (normalized)	$1.52	$1.55	+1.9%	Beat
Q2 FY2025	Revenue	$2.97bn	$3.15bn	+6.1%	Beat
Q2 FY2025	EPS (normalized)	$1.49	$1.81	+21.7%	Beat
Q1 FY2025	Revenue	$2.93bn	$2.94bn	+0.6%	Beat
Q1 FY2025	EPS (normalized)	$1.52	$1.38	-9.2%	Miss

FY2028 revenue and EPS both cut about 2% over the past 90 days

FY2027 estimates are roughly stable over 90 days, but FY2028 revenue and normalized EPS were each cut about 2%. The recent direction of travel is down, consistent with the run of top-line misses.

Currency: USD · Scale: money in millions, absolute · Point-in-time consensus; Δ90d is Now versus 90d.

Metric	FY	180d	90d	30d	Now	Δ90d
Revenue	FY2027	$11.58bn	$11.50bn	$11.40bn	$11.42bn	-0.8%
Revenue	FY2028	$12.21bn	$12.10bn	$11.98bn	$11.86bn	-1.9%
EPS (normalized)	FY2027	$6.10	$6.28	$6.25	$6.26	-0.3%
EPS (normalized)	FY2028	$6.77	$6.97	$6.87	$6.81	-2.3%

Consensus models an FY2027 EPS dip, then double-digit growth as revenue reaccelerates

Normalized EPS is expected to fall below the FY2026 actual in FY2027 before compounding, while revenue growth builds from low-single to roughly 4%. EBITDA follows the same recovery path.

Currency: USD · Scale: money in millions, absolute · YoY uses the prior fiscal year from the feed; analyst count and range use the first displayed period.

Metric	FY2027E	FY2028E	FY2029E	YoY	Analysts	Low / high
Revenue	$11.42bn	$11.86bn	$12.33bn	+1.8%	14	$11.21bn / $11.54bn
EPS (normalized)	$6.26	$6.81	$7.50	-3.8%	14	$5.92 / $6.50
EBITDA	$1.26bn	$1.31bn	$1.37bn	+2.4%	11	$1.22bn / $1.28bn

Outer-year EPS estimates diverge widely — FY2029 spans $6.63 to $8.15

The FY2029 normalized-EPS range is wide on only seven analysts; the recovery thesis is far from settled the further out you look.

Currency: USD · Scale: money in millions, absolute · Spread/mean is absolute high-low divided by absolute mean.

Metric	Period	Mean	Low–high	Spread/mean	Analysts
EPS (normalized)	FY2029E	$7.50	$6.63–$8.15	20.3%	7
EPS (normalized)	FY2028E	$6.81	$6.38–$7.12	10.9%	12
Revenue	FY2029E	$12.33bn	$11.88bn–$12.71bn	6.7%	7

Hold-heavy street; targets range from $65 to $140

Eight of fourteen ratings are holds, with three buys against one sell and two underperforms. The $65-$140 target range signals unusually split views on fair value.

Currency: USD · Scale: money in millions, absolute · Analyst counts shown explicitly.

Street view	Reading	Analysts
Recommendation mix	Buy 3, Outperform 0, Hold 8, Underperform 2, Sell 1	14
Consensus score	2.86	14
Target price	mean $84.00; median $77.50; high $140.0; low $65.00	12

Coverage thins sharply in FY2029

FY2029 revenue is covered by seven analysts and GAAP net income by only three. The far-year ranges should be read as directional, not settled.

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Visible Alpha broker models via S&P Xpressfeed · 12 brokers · 359 line items · freshest revision 2026-07-22.

Key drivers

Line	FY-2025A	FY-2026A	FY-2027E	FY-2028E	YoY	Brokers
Free Cash Flow	$892.00m	$881.12m	$867.75m	$933.91m	-1.5%	12
Free Cash flow per share($)	$6.94	$7.20	$7.29	$8.07	+1.2%	12
General & administrative expenses	$1.30bn	$1.30bn	$1.29bn	$1.33bn	-0.5%	12
Income/(loss) before income taxes	$1.19bn	$834.15m	$897.95m	$954.02m	+7.6%	12
Shares - Diluted(M#)	128.37m Number	122.35m Number	119.04m Number	115.80m Number	-2.7%	12
Total costs & expenses	$10.69bn	$9.55bn	$10.32bn	$10.69bn	+8.1%	12
Billable expenses	$3.79bn	$3.47bn	$3.51bn	$3.63bn	+1.2%	11
EPS - Diluted - Operating($)	$6.35	$6.08	$6.24	$6.78	+2.7%	11
EPS - Diluted($)	$7.17	$6.50	$5.93	$6.44	-8.8%	11
Income/(loss) from continuing operations	$904.93m	$797.17m	$703.41m	$741.96m	-11.8%	11

Quarterly path

Line	2QFY-2026A	3QFY-2026A	4QFY-2026A	1QFY-2027A	2QFY-2027E	3QFY-2027E	4QFY-2027E	1QFY-2028E	Brokers
Total revenue	$2.97bn	$2.73bn	$2.86bn	$2.82bn	$2.87bn	$2.78bn	$2.94bn	$2.93bn	12
EPS Diluted, Applicable to common stockholders($)	$1.51	$1.28	$1.34	$1.49	$1.58	$1.51	$1.66	$1.62	12
Free Cash Flow	$320.28m	$182.24m	$142.69m	$155.72m	$237.05m	$220.78m	$256.75m	$157.75m	10
Free Cash flow per share($)	$2.59	$1.49	$1.18	$1.30	$1.99	$1.86	$2.17	$1.35	10
General & administrative expenses	$357.48m	$321.68m	$347.50m	$315.75m	$320.39m	$320.53m	$332.10m	$331.26m	12

Where broker models disagree

Line	Period	Median	Q1–Q3	Min–max	Brokers
Net proceeds from issuance of stock	FY-2027E	$6.00m	$0.00–$28.50m	$0.00–$45.00m	6
Other increase/(decrease) in current liabilities	FY-2027E	$8.06m	$-17.92m–$16.43m	$-94.35m–$34.00m	6
Increase/(decrease) in current liabilities	FY-2028E	$24.02m	$-21.41m–$60.41m	$-54.26m–$66.43m	7
Other (increase)/decrease in current assets	FY-2027E	$-5.57m	$-18.47m–$-1.00m	$-20.00m–$7.14m	5
Other operating adjustments	FY-2028E	$90.00m	$61.00m–$212.20m	$35.00m–$221.00m	5

Headline P&L consensus, momentum and beat/miss live in the CapIQ tab.

---

Source: S&P Capital IQ transcripts via Xpressfeed · latest indexed call 2026-05-22 · generated 2026-07-24.

Latest call digest

Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation, Q4 2026 Earnings Call, May 22, 2026 · 2026-05-22T12:00:00

Q4 FY2026 call — May 22, 2026. The prepared remarks framed fiscal 2026 as the hardest year Booz Allen has had as a public company: gross revenue fell to $11.2 billion, Civil declined sharply, and adjusted EBITDA landed around $1.2 billion at an 11% margin. Management introduced new CFO Troy Lahr and Kristine Anderson's added President title, then guided fiscal 2027 to revenue of $11.2–11.7 billion, adjusted EPS of $6–6.35 and free cash flow of $825–925 million, with National Security growing mid-single digits and Civil declining high single digits. In the Q&A the tone was more optimistic than the numbers, but analysts repeatedly pushed on where the guide's low-versus-high ends come from, the shape of a year that starts negative in Civil and improves in the second half, whether the funding recovery since January is durable or another head fake, and how headcount is being managed against a still-declining top line. Management leaned on cost discipline, the outcome-based/fixed-price transition and cyber/defense-tech growth vectors, and declined to size individual businesses when pressed.

Participant coverage from the latest call.

Group	Participants	Count
Management	Operator; Dustin Darensbourg — Director & Head of Investor Relations, Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation; Horacio Rozanski — CEO & Chair, Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation; Kristine Anderson — COO & President, Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation; Troy Lahr — Executive VP & CFO, Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation	5
Analysts	Gavin Parsons — Analyst, UBS Investment Bank, Research Division; Louie Dipalma — Partner & Research Analyst of Industrials, William Blair & Company L.L.C., Research Division; Gautam Khanna — MD & Senior Analyst, TD Cowen, Research Division; John Godyn — Research Analyst, Citigroup Inc., Research Division; Unknown Analyst; David Strauss — Equity Analyst, Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Research Division; Noah Poponak — Equity Analyst, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Research Division; Scott Mikus — Director of Aerospace, Defense and Space Research, Melius Research LLC; Sheila Kahyaoglu — Managing Director in Equity Research, Jefferies LLC, Research Division	9

Curated latest-call exchanges; one row per analyst topic.

Analyst	Firm	Topic	What changed in Q&A
Gavin Parsons	UBS Investment Bank, Research Division	Revenue growth decoupling from headcount; funded backlog to revenue	Asked how growth diverges from headcount and how funding awards convert to revenue after funded backlog fell; CEO tied divergence to outcome-based work and IP monetization and pointed to improved recent funding.
John Godyn	Citigroup Inc., Research Division	Shape of the fiscal-2027 guide, low vs. high end	Pressed twice for the drivers of the range and the intra-year cadence; management held to a Civil-pressured first half improving through the year but declined quarter-by-quarter detail.
Noah Poponak	Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Research Division	Durability of the funding recovery	Asked why the improved funding is a real trend rather than another head fake; management cited a normalized-but-not-historic environment and would not call the future.
David Strauss	Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Research Division	Civil sequential trajectory; sizing Space and Health	Sought clarity on whether Civil keeps rising sequentially and asked for growth figures on Space and Health; CEO declined to put specific numbers on those businesses.
Scott Mikus	Melius Research LLC	Buyback appetite under the executive order; cost-takeout retention	Questioned lighter repurchases and any EO constraint on capital returns; CFO reaffirmed dividend-first and continued buybacks and said the company keeps about 40% of the cost takeout.
Sheila Kahyaoglu	Jefferies LLC, Research Division	Headcount down 12% with revenue-per-employee up 6%; margins	Probed productivity gains and how the Civil mix affects fiscal-2027 margins; management flagged puts and takes but comfort with roughly flat ~11% margins.
Gautam Khanna	TD Cowen, Research Division	Procurement pace and IRS/Treasury reputational risk	Asked whether reputational issues blocked bids; management said conversations are productive and pointed to mid-single-digit National Security growth as evidence of no impediment.
Louie Dipalma	William Blair & Company L.L.C., Research Division	Agentic cyber demand and the Golden Dome OTA	Asked about agentic-AI cyber impact and the space-based interceptor award; CEO could not trace demand to a single event but reiterated accelerating cyber demand, and could not discuss the classified Golden Dome role.

Theme tracker

Themes are curator-classified across supplied calls.

Theme	Status	Quarters mentioned	Read-through
Bifurcation: National Security growth vs. Civil decline	persisted	Q4 2025, Q1 2026, Q2 2026, Q3 2026, Q4 2026	The central framing of every recent call: Defense/Intel growing while Civil resets. It sharpened in Q2 2026 and remained the organizing lens through the latest guide.
Shift to outcome-based and fixed-price contracting	persisted	Q4 2025, Q1 2026, Q2 2026, Q3 2026, Q4 2026	Positioned as both a delivery change and a margin lever; management describes a steady, contract-by-contract conversion accelerated by procurement reform rather than a step change.
Cyber productization (Thunderdome, Vellox, agentic cyber)	persisted	Q4 2025, Q2 2026, Q3 2026, Q4 2026	Evolved from services and Zero Trust toward named products; Vellox Reverser reached general availability in Q3 2026 and the agentic-cyber pitch intensified into the latest call.
Cost reduction and delayering (~$150M annualized)	emerged	Q2 2026, Q3 2026, Q4 2026	Announced in Q2 2026, executed in Q3 2026, and cited in Q4 2026 as roughly one-third realized in fiscal 2026 with the full run-rate landing in fiscal 2027; about 40% is retained.
Tech-ecosystem partnerships and Booz Allen Ventures	persisted	Q4 2025, Q1 2026, Q2 2026, Q3 2026, Q4 2026	NVIDIA and AWS are long-standing; the a16z acceleration partnership and up-to-$400M fund commitment emerged in Q3 2026, and ventures gains increasingly touch EPS.
Golden Dome / space	persisted	Q4 2025, Q1 2026, Q3 2026, Q4 2026	Discussed as a pursuit for several quarters and converted to a disclosed space-based interceptor OTA award by Q4 2026, though the role remains classified.
FY2021 Investor Day investment-thesis framing	dropped	Q3 2025, Q4 2025	The multiyear EBITDA-target narrative anchored calls through the close of fiscal 2025, then disappeared once the thesis period ended; its absence reflects a completed goal rather than a reversal.

Guidance ledger

Quotes, calls, and speakers are source-verified; outcomes are curator-classified.

Verbatim guidance	Call	Speaker	Curator outcome	Outcome note
“We expect to deliver revenue between $12 billion and $12.5 billion.”	Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation, Q4 2025 Earnings Call, May 23, 2025 · 2025-05-23T12:00:00	Matthew Calderone	missed	This original fiscal-2026 range was cut over the following quarters; fiscal-2026 gross revenue finished at about $11.2 billion, below the low end.
“We expect to generate adjusted EBITDA dollars in the range of $1.315 billion to $1.37 billion.”	Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation, Q4 2025 Earnings Call, May 23, 2025 · 2025-05-23T12:00:00	Matthew Calderone	missed	Fiscal-2026 adjusted EBITDA came in around $1.2 billion per the Q4 2026 call, below this initial range.
“We now expect to deliver revenue between $11.3 billion and $11.5 billion.”	Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation, Q2 2026 Earnings Call, Oct 24, 2025 · 2025-10-24T12:00:00	Matthew Calderone	missed	Even this lowered range proved slightly high; fiscal-2026 revenue landed near $11.2 billion, at or just below the bottom.
“restructuring our business to take out a net incremental $150 million of cost on an annualized basis”	Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation, Q2 2026 Earnings Call, Oct 24, 2025 · 2025-10-24T12:00:00	Matthew Calderone	kept	Later calls confirmed the actions were executed, with run-rate spend dropped by roughly $150 million and about one-third realized in fiscal 2026.
“We now expect free cash flow to be between $900 million and $1 billion.”	Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation, Q1 2026 Earnings Call, Jul 25, 2025 · 2025-07-25T12:00:00	Matthew Calderone	kept	Despite later downward revisions to the free-cash-flow range, fiscal-2026 free cash flow of $951 million fell within this raised range.
“we expect to deliver revenue between $11.2 billion and $11.7 billion”	Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation, Q4 2026 Earnings Call, May 22, 2026 · 2026-05-22T12:00:00	Troy Lahr	pending	Fiscal-2027 revenue guidance issued on the latest call; no subsequent call in the set to judge the outcome.
“We expect adjusted EPS to be in the range of $6 to $6.35.”	Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation, Q4 2026 Earnings Call, May 22, 2026 · 2026-05-22T12:00:00	Troy Lahr	pending	Fiscal-2027 adjusted EPS guidance; outcome not yet observable in the supplied call history.

Q&A pressure map

Question counts and firms are curator tallies; analyst coverage shown above.

Topic	Questions	Firms	Pressure / response
Civil decline and the timing of a return to growth	9	Jefferies LLC, Research Division, Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., Research Division, William Blair & Company L.L.C., Research Division, Citigroup Inc., Research Division, Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Research Division, BofA Securities, Research Division	The most persistent line of questioning across the last five calls; analysts repeatedly asked when Civil bottoms and inflects, and management kept pointing the recovery further out — into the second half, then the next fiscal year.
Funding and procurement pace vs. funded-backlog conversion	6	TD Cowen, Research Division, UBS Investment Bank, Research Division, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Research Division, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Research Division, William Blair & Company L.L.C., Research Division	Analysts pressed on the gap between strong awards and soft funded backlog and on whether the post-shutdown pickup is durable; management conceded a choppier, more episodic funding pattern than in prior years.
Headcount managed against a declining top line	5	Jefferies LLC, Research Division, Melius Research LLC, TD Cowen, Research Division, UBS Investment Bank, Research Division	Recurring questions on whether revenue can grow faster than headcount and whether cuts risk being overdone; management pointed to fixed-price mix, higher utilization and AI-assisted productivity.
Sizing individual businesses (Space, Health, Cyber)	2	Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Research Division, BofA Securities, Research Division	When asked to quantify specific businesses, management declined — in Q4 2026 the CEO said it was very hard to put a specific number on Space or Health, and in Q2 2026 the cyber business was not sized. The answers plainly did not provide the figures requested.
Capital returns and buybacks under the executive order	2	Melius Research LLC, Truist Securities, Inc., Research Division	Analysts asked whether the executive order on capital returns constrains repurchases; management said it does not apply to Booz Allen negatively and reaffirmed dividend-first, opportunistic buybacks.

Language shifts

Only language evidence verified against the referenced component is shown.

Observation	Verbatim evidence	Call ID	Component
A new caution word entered the vocabulary in Q2 2026 — management began labeling the Civil/National Security split a 'bifurcation' and reached for superlatives to describe the environment, a framing that then recurred.	“This is the most bifurcated environment I have seen in my decades with Booz Allen.”	1960390514	2
The Q2 2026 call marked the clearest drop in confidence in the set, with the CEO plainly conceding disappointment while cutting guidance across the board.	“I am disappointed in our results this quarter and that we are lowering guidance across all key metrics.”	1960390514	2
By the latest call the register shifted from crisis to recovery: the CEO acknowledged the hardest year on record but paired it with a forward claim of strength.	“Fiscal year 2026 was the most challenging year we faced as a public company.”	1994235646	2
'Choppy' and 'volatility' became standing hedges on the market outlook, carried into the fiscal-2027 framing rather than presented as a one-time disruption.	“still a market that will experience volatility and some choppiness”	1994235646	9

The call history documents a full guidance-down cycle through fiscal 2026 — two revenue cuts and a missed EBITDA range — followed by a latest call that pairs a stabilized cost base and improving funding with a still-cautious, Civil-pressured fiscal-2027 setup. For the current debate, the useful signal is that management has consistently pushed the Civil inflection outward while National Security and the outcome-based transition carry the growth story; the durability of the post-January funding recovery is the swing factor to watch.

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Booz Allen Hamilton: a government compounder, marked down

Booz Allen Hamilton sells advanced-technology and consulting work almost entirely to the U.S. government — roughly 98% of revenue [1]. For a decade the stock compounded from a $19 IPO to a $186 peak in October 2024. It then lost roughly two-thirds of its value as federal budget retrenchment hit its Civil business. The franchise still throws off cash; the multiple no longer treats it as a grower. This chapter sets out what the company is, how it earns, and the question the rest of the report exists to answer.

What the company is

Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation (NYSE: BAH) is a McLean, Virginia advanced-technology and consulting firm, incorporated in Delaware in 2008 and run as a single reportable segment [2]. Its business is putting cleared, credentialed people and, increasingly, proprietary technology against the missions of U.S. defense, intelligence, and civilian agencies. At March 31, 2026 it employed about 31,500 people, of whom 28,800 were client-facing staff, and roughly 77% held U.S. government security clearances [3]. Management now frames the company as an "advanced technology" business rather than a pure consultancy, positioning itself as the federal government's largest AI provider with roughly 400 active AI projects alongside one of the larger cyber practices serving federal and defense customers [4].

Sources: FY2026 revenue and net income per the FY2026 Form 10-K [5]; free cash flow and total backlog per the Q4 FY2026 earnings presentation [6].

Source: derived from the $65.87 close on July 24, 2026 and 122.4M diluted shares, against reported FY2026 free cash flow and the $0.59 quarterly dividend [7].

How it makes money

Two lenses matter. By customer, the book splits into a National Security core — Defense and Intelligence agencies — and a Civil-and-Commercial remainder that is dominated by federal civilian agencies. In FY2026 National Security customers were 71% of revenue and grew about 2%, while Civil and Commercial fell 22% [8]. That single line is the whole story of the year: the core held, the civilian side broke.

Source: FY2026 Form 10-K, Note 3 Revenue (revenue by customer type, FY2024–FY2026) [9].

By contract, the economics are those of a cost-plus government contractor, not a fixed-price builder: 59% of FY2026 revenue was cost-reimbursable, 22% time-and-materials, and 19% fixed-price [10]. Most of the book bills labor and reimbursable costs to the government at a margin, which is why the model generates steady cash but modest reported margins, and why headcount tracks revenue closely — cost of revenue fell alongside revenue in FY2026 as staff were cut [11].

A decade up, a year down

From its November 2010 IPO the stock compounded steadily, reaching a $186 close on October 28, 2024. It has since fallen to about $66 — a drawdown of roughly 65% from the peak, giving back several years of gains.

Source: daily closing prices, as reported; FY2024 close $148.44, October 2024 peak $186.00, July 24, 2026 close $65.87.

The de-rating is not only price — it is the multiple. At the peak the market paid roughly 25 times earnings for a business growing double digits. At $66 it pays about 9.5 times GAAP earnings and roughly 9 times enterprise value to adjusted EBITDA, valuing Booz Allen as a slow-growth contractor rather than a compounder. Underlying earnings did not collapse to match: net income fell only 9% in FY2026, to $851 million, and adjusted diluted EPS actually rose to $6.51 [12].

Source: derived from reported financials, FY2022–FY2026 Forms 10-K [13].

What broke, and what held

FY2026 was, in the CEO's words, "the most challenging year we faced as a public company," driven by "unprecedented headwinds" in the Civil business [14]. The proximate causes were a slowed federal procurement and funding environment, a government shutdown in the third quarter, and a broad U.S. government push to reduce spending across civilian, defense, and intelligence agencies [15], [16]. Revenue fell 6% and the company cut headcount from about 35,800 to 31,500 to defend margins.

What held is the other half of the ledger. Total backlog reached a record $38.2 billion, up from $37.0 billion a year earlier, with a trailing book-to-bill of 1.1x [17], [18]. Free cash flow was $951 million, and the company returned $837 million to shareholders through buybacks and a raised $0.59 quarterly dividend [19]. The balance sheet is levered but not stretched: net debt of roughly $3.2 billion sits at about 2.6 times adjusted EBITDA, and the business remains solidly investment-grade — a point that matters for a reader who wants the chance of insolvency to be near zero.

The question this report answers

For FY2027 management guides to revenue of $11.2–$11.7 billion — flat to 4% growth — with adjusted EPS of $6.00–$6.35 and free cash flow of $825–$925 million [20]. That is a stabilization budget, not a recovery one: it assumes the Civil bleeding slows while National Security keeps the total roughly flat, and it brackets a year in which the company grows into a share count it has been steadily shrinking.

At about $66, Booz Allen trades near 9.5 times GAAP earnings and an 11.8% free-cash-flow yield — pricing that already embeds a materially smaller federal purse. The central question this report exists to answer: is Booz Allen's roughly 65% de-rating a durable impairment of a government-services franchise now facing structurally lower federal spending, or the trough of a policy-driven cycle in a cash-generative, backlog-rich business whose National Security core keeps growing — and how much of that pessimism a single-digit multiple already reflects. The chapters that follow test each part of that question in turn: the durability of the National Security core, the depth and duration of the Civil shock, the cash economics and balance sheet, who owns and runs the company, and what the price implies against the forward numbers.

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Financials and Estimates

Over the last three years Booz Allen grew revenue from $10.7B to a $12.0B peak and back to $11.2B, while cash generation swung far more violently than the income statement — from $192M of free cash flow in FY2024 to roughly $950M in each of FY2025 and FY2026. The headline that FY2026 net income fell only 9% understates the operating decline: operating income dropped 25%, and a near-zero tax rate did most of the cushioning. Management's own numbers put "clean" earnings power near $5.90 a share, below both the $6.90 GAAP and $6.51 adjusted figures.

The three-year record

Source: FY2026 Annual Report (Form 10-K), Consolidated Statements of Operations and Cash Flows [1] [2].

The revenue line tells a cyclical, not linear, story. Revenue rose 12% in FY2024 and 12% again in FY2025 to $11,980M, then fell 6% to $11,217M in FY2026 as a slowed procurement environment — including the third-quarter government shutdown — cut headcount and billable expenses [3]. Operating margin has been just as variable: 4.8% in FY2023, recovering to a 11.4% peak in FY2025 before settling at 9.2% in FY2026. FY2023 is the useful precedent — a prior margin trough the business worked its way out of within two years.

Source: FY2026 Annual Report (Form 10-K), Consolidated Statements of Operations [4]; FY2022–FY2024 from FY2024 Annual Report (Form 10-K) [5].

Source: derived from reported operating income and revenue, FY2024–FY2026 Annual Reports [6] [7].

Why net income held up better than operating income

The gap between the −25% operating-income decline and the −9% net-income decline is worth pausing on, because it is where the earnings quality lives. Operating income fell from $1,370M to $1,033M as margin compressed from 11% to 9% [8]. Below the operating line, interest expense rose to $184M and pre-tax income landed at $862M — yet the tax charge collapsed from $284M (a 23.3% rate) to $11M, a 1.3% effective rate [9]. That $273M tax swing is why net income of $851M looks resilient.

The tax note itself separates the recurring from the one-off. Against the 21% federal statutory charge of $181M, research-and-development credits removed $103M (12.0 points) and a favorable change in uncertain tax positions removed a further $80M (9.3 points) [10]. The R&D credit is a repeatable feature of a labor-and-engineering business; the reserve release is not.

Management does the subtraction for you. Its FY2027 earnings bridge starts from the $6.51 adjusted EPS reported for FY2026, removes $0.11 of unrealized venture-investment gains and $0.50 of "non-recurring portion of R&D tax credit benefit," and arrives at a clean base of $5.90 [11]. Two facts follow. First, this is one of the rare cases where GAAP diluted EPS ($6.90) sits above the adjusted figure ($6.51) — the ordering is inverted precisely because GAAP captured the tax benefit that the non-GAAP measure normalizes away [12]. Second, the honest run-rate to anchor a valuation on is nearer $5.90 than $6.90.

The counter-fact, stated fairly: the largest single driver of the low rate — the $103M R&D credit — is structural, not a gimmick, and it recurs. Even the FY2027 guide assumes a normalized 20–23% tax rate and still lands at $6.00–$6.35, so the "clean" earnings base is real, not an accounting mirage. What changes the read is durability of the R&D-credit level and whether reserve releases keep recurring; a snap-back to a full statutory rate on the current pre-tax base would cut EPS by roughly a dollar.

Cash economics

Free cash flow is the number this business is usually bought for, and it has been the least stable line of all. Operating cash flow was $259M in FY2024, $1,009M in FY2025, and $1,041M in FY2026; against modest capital spending of $67M, $98M and $90M, free cash flow ran $192M, $911M and $951M [13].

Source: FY2026 Annual Report (Form 10-K), Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows and Operations [14].

Both extremes have identifiable, non-recurring mechanisms. The FY2024 trough was a cash-tax event: the required capitalization of research costs drove large tax payments and a $270M build in receivables, so only 43% of that year's $606M net income converted to operating cash [15]. FY2026 flatters in the opposite direction: as revenue shrank, receivables unwound, releasing $207M of cash and lifting operating cash flow above net income even as the business contracted [16]. Strip that working-capital tailwind and the underlying free cash flow is closer to $750M. Across all three years, cumulative free cash flow of $2.05B against $2.39B of net income is a 86% conversion rate — respectable, but flattered at the front by FY2026 and depressed at the back by FY2024, so no single year is a clean run-rate.

Balance sheet and the bankruptcy question

For a reader who wants the chance of ruin near zero, the debt is serviceable but the equity offers no asset cushion. Net debt was $3,212M at FY2026 — total debt of $3,940M less $728M of cash — against adjusted EBITDA of $1,229M, or about 2.6x [17] [18]. Operating income covers net interest 5.6 times, and total liquidity was $2.2B — $728M of cash plus $1.5B available under the revolver — with the nearest large maturity being the 5.95% notes due 2035 [19]. On coverage and maturity profile, near-term default risk is low.

The asset side is the caution. Reported equity is only $1,105M, and that already sits after $3,673M of treasury stock accumulated through years of buybacks; goodwill ($2,399M) and other intangibles ($509M) together are 41% of the $7,118M balance sheet [20]. Net of those soft assets, tangible book equity is roughly negative $1.8B. This is a cleared-workforce-and-contracts business, not an asset play: the margin of safety, if there is one, has to come from cash flow and backlog coverage, not from anything a liquidator could sell.

Source: FY2026 Annual Report (Form 10-K), Consolidated Balance Sheets; tangible equity derived as reported equity less goodwill and intangibles [21].

Capital returns stayed heavy through the downturn. In FY2026 the company paid $276M of dividends ($2.24 per share, since raised to $0.59 quarterly) and repurchased 5.6 million shares for $561M, with $684M left under the authorization [22]. Combined returns of roughly $837M sat just inside the $951M of free cash flow — sustainable at this level, but with little room to spare if free cash flow reverts toward the underlying $750M.

Forward estimates

Management's FY2027 guidance is for stabilization rather than recovery: revenue of $11.2–$11.7B (0–4% growth), adjusted EBITDA of $1,240–$1,290M at roughly 11% margin, adjusted EPS of $6.00–$6.35, and free cash flow of $825–$925M. The guide explicitly assumes the tax rate normalizes to 20–23% and capital spending steps up to $220M, of which $105M is a new headquarters [23]. Sell-side consensus is close to the midpoint — roughly $11.4B of revenue and $6.29 adjusted EPS for FY2027, building to about $11.9B and $6.85 for FY2028 — with a mean price target near $79 against the current $66, but a rating split that skews cautious: of 13 analysts, two buys, eight holds and three sells (per compiled analyst estimates).

Source: FY2025–FY2026 reported revenue, FY2026 Annual Report (Form 10-K) [24]; FY2027–FY2028 are compiled analyst consensus.

One forward-looking anchor cuts against the falling top line: total backlog rose to $38,187M at FY2026 from $37,027M a year earlier, so contracted future work grew even as recognized revenue fell [25]. Backlog is a coverage signal, not a timing guarantee — funded backlog is only $4,319M of that total, and the rest depends on options being exercised and appropriations flowing — but a building book while revenue troughs is more consistent with a cyclical pause than a structural unwind.

On the current $66 price and about 120 million diluted shares, the market values the equity near $7.9B and the enterprise near $11.1B. That is roughly 10.5x consensus FY2027 adjusted EPS, about 9x enterprise value to FY2027 EBITDA, and an 11% free-cash-flow yield on the guidance midpoint, with a 3.6% dividend yield alongside. Against a clean earnings base of $5.90 the multiple is nearer 11x. Whether that is cheap turns on the durability of the National Security core and the depth of the Civil trough — the operating questions this chapter's financials frame but do not settle.

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The Cleared Moat

Booz Allen's defensibility rests on four things that are hard to copy: a security-cleared workforce, incumbency on thousands of task orders, revenue spread so thin no single contract matters, and the position of the federal government's largest AI provider. The clearest evidence that this holds is the recompete win rate — roughly nine in ten every year for six years — and a National Security core that kept growing about 2% while Civil collapsed in fiscal 2026. The moat is real. It is also narrowing at the edges, and this chapter measures both.

What the moat is made of

Booz Allen competes for U.S. government work against enterprise-software firms, global technology providers, the large defense primes, pure-play services contractors, and startups — and it says it wins on technical capability, past performance, its relationships with customers, pricing, and its ability to recruit and retain skilled, security-cleared talent [1]. None of those is a patent. Three of them are structural barriers that take a rival years to reproduce.

The first is clearances. About 77% of the roughly 31,500-person workforce holds a security clearance [1] — a share that has risen since the 2010 IPO, when 71% held clearances and a quarter of the firm sat at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information level [2]. A cleared analyst cannot be hired on a day's notice; the vetting is expensive, slow, and government-controlled, which is exactly what makes an installed base of cleared staff a barrier rather than a cost line.

The second is spread. Booz Allen delivered under 5,026 contracts and task orders in fiscal 2026, and about 84% of revenue came from 2,426 active task orders under IDIQ vehicles [3]. The largest single task order was about 4% of revenue and the largest definite contract about 1% [3]. No one lost re-compete sinks the year; the franchise is an aggregation of thousands of small mission footholds, not a handful of mega-programs.

Sources: FY2026 Form 10-K — Our People and Culture and Contracts [1] [3]; win rate p.9 [4]; AI projects p.7 [5].

The third barrier is technical position, and it is the one management is spending against hardest. Booz Allen describes itself as the federal government's largest AI provider, with roughly 400 active AI projects, and frames its VoLT strategy — Velocity, Leadership, Technology — around building specialized products at speed through venture investments and partnerships with hyperscalers and defense-tech firms [5]. That claim is harder to verify from the outside than a clearance count, but it is consistent with where the growth has been.

Nine in ten recompetes, six years running

The single most useful moat gauge Booz Allen discloses is its win rate on re-competed contracts — the work already held, put back out to bid. If incumbency were weak, this is where it would show. It does not. The recompete win rate has sat between 88% and 92% every year since fiscal 2021, and was 89% in fiscal 2026 [4].

Sources: win rates as reported in each fiscal year's Form 10-K — FY2026 and FY2025 [4]; FY2024 and FY2023 [6]; FY2022 and FY2021 [7].

The gap between the two lines is the point. Retaining held work at ~90% is a very different business from winning new work at 56–66%. It says the franchise's defensive perimeter is strong even when its offensive one is ordinary, and it is why the company can lose a competitive-bid cycle and still grow — the base rarely leaks. The new-business win rate is more volatile and has drifted down from 66% in fiscal 2023 to 57% in fiscal 2026 [4], which matters more for the growth case than for the moat.

The national-security core held

The fiscal 2026 revenue decline was not a franchise failure; it was a customer failure, and a specific one. Defense revenue rose to $6.07 billion and Intelligence to $1.90 billion, together about 2% higher, while Civil and Commercial fell 22% to $3.25 billion [8]. The National Security core has grown in each of the last three years; the shock was concentrated where federal-civilian budgets were cut.

Source: FY2026 Form 10-K, Note 3 Revenue — Disaggregation by customer type [8].

Two disclosures reinforce that the core is intact. Total backlog reached a record $38.2 billion at fiscal 2026 year-end, still growing even as revenue shrank [9]. And the demand pull sits with the highest-priority missions: the Department of Veterans Affairs alone was the single largest customer at 10% of revenue [4], and the defense and intelligence work is anchored to warfighter, cyber, and intelligence-community programs that are less exposed to civilian-efficiency cuts.

Where the moat is thinning

A durable moat is not a static one, and three cracks are visible. First, the recompete win rate, while high, slipped from 92% in fiscal 2024 and 2025 to 89% in fiscal 2026 [4]. Three points is within the historical band, but it is a downtick in the metric that most defines the franchise, in the same year the environment turned — worth watching rather than dismissing.

Second, procurement reform cuts against the shape of Booz Allen's book. A fiscal 2026 executive order, "Promoting Efficiency, Accountability, and Performance in Federal Contracting," directs agencies to increase the use of firm-fixed-price contracts for new awards to the maximum extent consistent with law [10]. Cost-reimbursable work was 59% of fiscal 2026 revenue [8]; a durable shift toward fixed-price awards would move risk onto the contractor and pressure the margin structure, however gradually.

Third, the offense is softer than the defense. The new-business win rate has fallen to 57%, and the growth engine now leans on the National Security core continuing to expand while Civil finds a floor. The moat protects what Booz Allen already has; it does not, on its own, guarantee the next leg of growth.

Scale among the named rivals

Booz Allen does not name its competitors in the fiscal 2026 filing, but its own compensation peer group and the broader federal-services set place it against a familiar field. Among the pure-play federal contractors, it is the second-largest by revenue — behind Leidos, ahead of CACI, SAIC, Parsons, and Maximus — and its operating margin, even in a trough year, sits in the upper half of the group.

Sources: most recent Form 10-K per company (fiscal year-ends differ): Booz Allen (year ended March 2026) [11]; Leidos (Jan 2025) [12]; CACI (Jun 2025) [13]; SAIC (Jan 2025) [14]; Parsons (Dec 2024) [15]; Maximus (Sep 2024) [16].

The scale table carries a caveat: these firms are not identical. Leidos is larger but more diversified, carrying health, commercial, and security-products lines outside the pure government-services model [12], and Maximus is weighted toward health and human-services business-process work rather than defense and intelligence. The head-to-head national-security rivals are CACI and SAIC, and Booz Allen is bigger than both. Size is not itself a moat, but in a market where past performance and the ability to field cleared teams at scale are award criteria, being the second-largest player is a structural advantage that compounds with the clearance and incumbency barriers above.

What the evidence supports

The weight of the evidence favours a durable franchise over an eroding one. The recompete win rate — the cleanest external read on incumbency — has held near 90% for six years and through the fiscal 2026 shock; the National Security core grew while Civil fell; backlog set a record; and Booz Allen enters the AI-procurement wave as the largest federal provider and the second-largest pure-play by revenue. That is the raw material of a business the market is pricing as impaired.

The strongest fact against the read is that the moat's best metrics are lagging and its softer ones are turning: the recompete rate ticked down to 89%, the new-business win rate has fallen to 57%, and a procurement shift toward fixed-price awards presses on a book that is still 59% cost-reimbursable. What would change the read is a second consecutive year of falling recompete win rates, or National Security growth stalling — either would suggest the erosion is structural rather than a single hard year. On the evidence to date, the moat is intact and the core is holding; the burden is on the bear to show that the fiscal 2026 cracks widen rather than close.

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Ownership and Pay

Booz Allen is professionally managed, not founder-run. The private-equity owner that built the public company exited a decade ago; its 22 directors and officers together hold about 1.08% of the stock, and the register is now dominated by index funds. Alignment is engineered rather than inherited — roughly three-quarters of CEO pay is equity, ownership mandates run to 43.5x salary, and the CEO bought $2 million of stock in the open market during the drawdown. For a skin-in-the-game investor, that is a designed substitute for founder control, not the real thing.

Not a founder's company

The name dates to 1914, but the entity a public shareholder owns today was assembled by private equity. The Carlyle Group, through a vehicle called Explorer Coinvest LLC, became Booz Allen's principal stockholder in a July 2008 merger that separated the U.S. government business from its commercial and international arm [1]. Carlyle took the company public in November 2010 and then sold down over six years, reporting a zero stake by its final Schedule 13D/A in December 2016 [2]. There is no founder block, no family holding, and no controlling shareholder left in the stock.

What replaced Carlyle is passive money. The four holders that file above the 5% threshold — BlackRock at 10.93%, Vanguard's two management entities at a combined 11.9%, and T. Rowe Price Investment Management at 5.45% — are index and institutional managers, and together they hold roughly 28% of the shares [3].

Sources: 2026 Proxy Statement, beneficial-ownership tables [4] [5].

The board matches the profile: of thirteen directors only the CEO is not independent, and the Chair and CEO roles are combined in Horacio Rozanski, with a Lead Independent Director (Mark Gaumond, since July 2024) supplying the check the board says the unified role requires [6]. Three long-serving directors — including Charles Rossotti, a Carlyle senior advisor on the board since 2008 — are stepping down under a retirement policy adopted in May 2026, which lowers average board tenure from 8.37 to 6.24 years [7]. The incoming names are national-security principals rather than owner-operators: former Under Secretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy [8], former National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien [9], and former House Armed Services chairman Mac Thornberry [10]. The boardroom is being reshaped to mirror the business.

What the insiders own

The hard number a margin-of-safety investor wants is small. As of May 2026, all 22 directors and executive officers as a group beneficially owned 1,294,612 shares — 1.08% of the company — and every individual, the CEO included, is flagged as owning less than 1% [11].

Sources: 2026 Proxy Statement, ownership table [12] and Executive Ownership Requirements / say-on-pay result [13]; CEO stake value derived from 672,587 shares at the ~$66 price.

Two readings of the same fact matter, and they point in different directions. In percentage terms the alignment is thin: Rozanski's 672,587 shares are about 0.56% of a company of roughly 120 million shares, so insiders cannot outvote a single index fund. In absolute-dollar terms it is not trivial — at the current price near $66 the CEO's beneficial stake is worth roughly $44 million, and the firm's ownership rules push the number higher still by counting unvested awards. Both are true; which one governs depends on whether the reader is buying alignment of wealth or alignment of control. Here it is wealth, not control.

How management is paid

Pay is large in absolute terms and heavily weighted to equity. Rozanski's fiscal-2026 total compensation was $13.8 million, of which the $1.5 million salary is about 11% and the $10.2 million of stock awards about 74%; the remainder is annual cash incentive [14]. The other named officers cluster between $2.7 million and $3.9 million, with the same equity-first shape.

Source: 2026 Proxy Statement, Summary Compensation Table for fiscal 2026 [15].

Two features reinforce the pay design. Shareholders endorse it — about 98% of votes cast at the 2025 annual meeting supported the say-on-pay proposal [16] — and the governance around it is clean by the standards a skeptic checks first: the company maintains a clawback policy, does not reprice underwater options, requires meaningful stock ownership, and bans hedging or pledging of company stock [17]. One wrinkle is specific to a federal contractor: under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, compensation above an Office of Management and Budget benchmark — $671,000 for the most recent year — is "unallowable" and cannot be recovered under government contracts, so the bulk of executive pay is a charge to shareholders rather than a reimbursed contract cost [18].

Alignment, engineered

Where Booz Allen cannot offer founder ownership, it substitutes mandates. The CEO is required to hold equity worth 7x his base salary and actually holds 43.5x; other named officers are required to hold 4x and average 10.9x — and until an executive clears the threshold, the company bars them from selling any granted equity at all [19]. Non-employee directors face a parallel rule of five times their annual retainer [20].

The clearest single signal sits in the trading record, and it cuts the reader's way. On October 30, 2025 — with the stock near $85, roughly 55% below its 2024 peak — Rozanski made an open-market purchase of 23,800 shares for about $2.0 million of his own cash, not a grant [21]. Director Joan Amble likewise bought shares in the open market on the way down, near $147 in late 2024 and again near $131 in February 2025 [22]. That behaviour contrasts with the months around the October 2024 high, when several officers trimmed under pre-set 10b5-1 plans — the Chief Legal Officer sold about $2.2 million of stock at roughly $181 [23]. Insiders sold high on schedule and the CEO added low with discretion — a modest read that management sees the de-rating as a trough worth buying rather than a value trap to exit.

Source: SEC Form 4 filings, summarized [24].

The honest counter-weight is that engineered alignment is not the same as owner-operator alignment. The 43.5x-salary figure is flattered by unvested awards the executive has not paid for; the beneficial stake that is actually his is 0.56% of the company. The pay itself is generous for a firm whose shares just fell about 65%, and nearly all routine insider "acquisitions" in the record are grants and vestings, not cash purchases — the CEO's $2 million buy and a director's small adds are the exceptions, not the pattern. A reader who requires a promoter with real skin in the game will not find one here; a reader who will accept mandated equity plus clean governance plus one well-timed insider buy will find a credible, if manufactured, version of it. What would change the read is straightforward to watch: further open-market buying by officers as the stock stays depressed would strengthen it, while a wave of discretionary selling, a loosening of the ownership mandates, or a failed say-on-pay vote would undercut it.

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Federal Demand

Booz Allen's revenue moves with one buyer's checkbook — the U.S. government — and in FY2026 that checkbook split in two. National Security customers (71% of revenue) sit inside a defense, cyber, and AI budget the administration wants to grow toward record size; Civil and Commercial customers (29%) absorbed the sharpest reset in a generation as the efficiency drive slowed procurement and cut programs. The demand evidence points to a cyclical trough on the core and a structural rebasing of Civil, not a broad franchise failure — but the recovery arriving is slower and lower-quality than the growth machine that broke.

A bifurcated buyer

Management's own word for the demand picture is "bifurcation" [1]. The revenue-by-customer record makes the split concrete: over FY2024–FY2026 the National Security book (Defense plus Intelligence) grew from $6.82 billion to $7.97 billion — up about 17% across two years — while Civil and Commercial fell from a FY2025 peak of $4.17 billion to $3.25 billion, a 22% single-year drop [2]. The mix shifted with it: National Security rose from 64% of revenue to 71% in two years.

Source: FY2026 Annual Report (Form 10-K), revenue by customer [2].

Source: derived from FY2026 Annual Report (Form 10-K), revenue by customer [2].

The two halves face opposite weather. One book, management said, faces "the toughest market conditions we've seen in a generation"; the other "operates in a much more favorable environment" [1]. Reading each side on its own is what the demand question requires.

The Civil reset: structural or cyclical

The Civil shock has an identifiable cause. The FY2026 10-K describes reviews of spending "to ensure it aligns with the administration's priorities of maximizing governmental efficiency," under which contracts were "impacted, reduced or canceled," alongside "price adjustments and renegotiations" [3]. Personnel cuts at customer agencies and executive orders on procurement produced "a slowed procurement environment, with delays in the granting of new contract awards" and "a substantial reduction in the ordinary end of government fiscal year funding surge" [3]. This is a demand shock, not an execution failure.

The more useful evidence is how management's characterization moved across three consecutive quarters — the promise-versus-delivery record the transcript archive makes possible.

Sources: Q2 FY2026 transcript [4]; Q3 FY2026 transcript [5]; Q4 FY2026 transcript [6].

The arc reads as a cyclical bottom: no new declines through the back half of FY2026, then a positive Civil book-to-bill of 1.2x by Q4 [6]. The COO's framing is that the missions themselves endure — "Still need a strong FAA and aviation safety. You still need to deliver healthcare. You still need secure borders" — while "the focus area has changed" [7]. Enduring missions argue against permanent impairment of the addressable market.

Two facts cut the other way, and they are what make the reset partly structural rather than purely cyclical. First, the recovery is arriving in smaller pieces: management flagged that "many recompetes have shorter periods of performance and smaller scope," so "it will take time for the uptick in demand to translate into growth," and it guided Civil to further high-single-digit declines in FY2027 [6]. A market that awards more but smaller contracts is a structurally lower-revenue market even once volumes stabilize. Second, a meaningful slice of the Civil pipeline sits in the Department of Homeland Security, where FY2026 funding was provided "only on a partial basis" with immigration enforcement components "subject to funding uncertainty" [3] — a headwind management named specifically for the year ahead [8].

The read that fits the evidence: Civil is bottoming cyclically but rebasing structurally lower. The counter-fact a skeptic should hold is that this narrative comes from a management team that reduced Civil guidance repeatedly through FY2026, so "reset and accelerating" is a claim to verify against Civil book-to-bill and revenue in FY2027, not to bank.

The National Security tailwind

The other half of the buyer is where the industry tailwind lives, and it is exogenous — a budget the company does not control. Peer disclosures frame the magnitude cleanly. Defense was funded for GFY2025 under a full-year continuing resolution that set the base at $893 billion, with bipartisan support that CACI calls "constructive" given "the heightened current global threat environment" [9]. For GFY2027, the administration submitted a $1.5 trillion defense budget — a $1.15 trillion base plus $350 billion of reconciliation funding — which Parsons describes as "a 44% increase over current funding levels" and "the largest defense budget in history" [10].

Sources: CACI FY2025 10-K, GFY2025 full-year CR base of $893B [9]; Parsons Q1 FY2026 call, GFY2027 request of $1.5T ($1.15T base plus $350B reconciliation) [10].

Booz Allen is positioned against the priorities that budget funds. In Q4 FY2026 it won $1.7 billion of national-security work [6], including an Other Transaction Authority award on Golden Dome — the space-based missile-defense program — and BEATS, a $937 million single-award Army engineering contract [11]. Cyber is scaling into AI: the firm responds to "over 1,000 cyber incidents a year," is fast-tracking its agentic Vellox product suite, and bought Defy Security to expand commercial reach [11]. Its shift toward outcomes-based procurement is visible in the deal mix — roughly a 90% rise in OTA proposal submissions and a 50% rise in OTA awards year over year [6].

The tailwind is real but should not be over-drawn, for two reasons. National Security grew only about 2% in FY2026 despite this backdrop [2], because a larger topline does not mechanically convert to Booz Allen revenue: as the CEO put it, "most of our work does not sit at the line items in the budget," so what matters is "the overall certainty our customers feel about having the money there" [8]. And the company's own FY2027 guidance does not assume the $1.5 trillion figure lands [8] — a conservatism worth crediting, and a reminder that the record-budget headline is a proposal, not enacted appropriations.

Regulatory crosscurrents worth watching

The same efficiency drive that reset Civil is reshaping how all federal work is bought, and the direction cuts both ways for Booz Allen. An April 2026 executive order directs agencies to "increase the use of firm-fixed price contracts…to the maximum extent" and to renegotiate their largest non-fixed-price awards [12]. That pressures a book still 59% cost-reimbursable, but the company frames it as opportunity: fixed-price and outcomes-based work "generally offers higher margin opportunities because we receive the benefits of any cost savings," while carrying "greater financial risk" on overruns [12]. Whether that lifts or squeezes margins is a genuine open question, not a settled loss.

One order deserves the reader's attention because it touches the capital-return case directly (Ownership and Pay). A January 2026 executive order, "Prioritizing the Warfighter in Defense Contracting," empowers the Secretary of War to identify underperforming defense contractors that have "engaged in any stock buy-back or corporate distribution," with the potential to restrict their dividends and buybacks; proposed Senate legislation would go further with a "blanket prohibition" absent a waiver [12]. The order targets underperformers, so it is a tail risk rather than a base case, but it is the kind of item that would change a shareholder-return thesis if it landed.

The watch items are falsifiable. Civil book-to-bill above 1.0x and a return to sequential Civil revenue growth in the FY2027 second half would confirm the cyclical-trough read; continued declines through FY2027 would tilt it toward structural impairment. GFY2027 defense appropriations enacted near the request would firm the National Security tailwind; another full-year continuing resolution would blunt it. And any identification of Booz Allen under the January 2026 order would put its $837 million of annual capital returns in play. On the balance of demand evidence today, the trough reading is better supported than the impairment reading — but it rests on a National Security core doing the heavy lifting while Civil recovers into a smaller shape than it left.